Objects are central in visual, auditory, and tactual perception. But what counts as a perceptual object? I address this question via a structural unity schema, which specifies how a collection of parts must be arranged to compose an object for perception. On the theory I propose, perceptual objects are composed of parts that participate in causally sustained regularities. I argue that this theory falls out of a compelling account of the function of object perception, and illustrate its applications to multisensory (...) perception. I also argue that the account avoids problems faced by standard views of visual and auditory objects. (shrink)

We live in turbulent times, our world is changing at accelerating speed. Information is everywhere, but wisdom appears in short supply when trying to address key inter-related challenges of our time such as; runaway climate change, the loss of biodiversity, the depletion of natural resources, the on-going homogenization of culture, and rising inequity. Living in such times has implications for education and learning. This book explores the possibilities of designing and facilitating learning-based change and transitions towards sustainability. In 31 chapters (...) contributors from across the world discuss (re)emerging forms of learning that not only assist in breaking down unsustainable routines, forms of governance, production and consumption, but also can help create ones that are more sustainable. The book has been divided into three parts: re-orienting science and society, re-connecting people and planet and re-imagining education and learning. This is essential reading for educators, educational designers, change agents, researchers, students, policymakers and entrepreneurs alike, who are concerned about the well-being of the planet and convinced of our ability to do better. The content and related issues can be discussed on the blog by editor Arjen Wals: Transformative learning. 'We are living in times of incertitude, complexity, and contestation, but also of connectivity, responsibility, and new opportunities. This book analyses the consequences of these times for learning in formal, non-formal, and informal education. It explores the possibilities offered by the concept of sustainability as a central category of a holistic paradigm which harmonizes human beings with Earth. To change people and to change the world are interdependent processes - this book contributes to both.' Moacir Gadotti, Director of Paulo Freire Institute, São Paulo, Brazil 'I hope you share my excitement about the innovations for sustainability that this book catalogues and analyses. While the ecological news is grim, the human news is not. Even in a time of accelerating change, people are showing their enormous capacities to learn, adapt, restore and protect.' From the Foreword by Juliet Schor, author of ‘True Wealth: how and why millions of Americans are creating a time-rich, ecologically-light, small-scale high-satisfaction economy’ 'This book implies a ‘culture of critical commitment’ in educational thinking and practice - engaged enough to make a real difference to social-ecological resilience and sustainability but reflexively critical enough to learn constantly from experience and to keep options open in working for a sustainability transformation.' From the Afterword by Stephen Sterling, Professor of Sustainability Education, Centre for Sustainable Futures, Plymouth University, United Kingdom. (shrink)

Excerpt from Système des Beaux-Arts Au sujet de la doctrine de Kant il suffisait d'aver tir que je m'y accorde toujours en ce qui suit, sans avoir jamais à l'invoquer. J'ai dû procéder autrement à l'égard d'une idée directrice non moins importante, que j'ai trouvée en Descartes, mais que le Prince de l'entendement n'a nullement approchée du présent sujet. Je veux parler de l'imagination comme fonction ou puissance humaine, mais essentiellement définie par le mécanisme et les affections du corps humain. (...) Cette importante idée n'a certainement pas été assez suivie par ceux qui ont tenté de décrire convenable ment la nature humaine sans esprit de système et, par une conséquence naturelle, elle est ignorée de ceux qui réfléchissent volontiers sur les beaux-arts c'est pourquoi il ne m'a pas paru inutile de l'analyser avec suite. Mais il ne faut pas attendre d'après cela que quelque règle des arts soit tirée de cette idée-là; car ce sont les oeuvres qui donnent la règle en sorte que l'étude des différents arts serait ici comme la vérification d'une doctrine de l'imagination d'abord proposée. Et comme cette méthode, qui consiste à exposer et expliquer autant que l'on peut, sans jamais tenter de rien prouver, risque d'étonner les esprits jeunes, communément formés par l'argumentation et les polémiques, il faut donc que j'ajoute ici un troi sième avertissement. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

It is argued that the dispute between philosophical naturalism and theism can, ultimately, only be rationally resolved in favor of theism, owing to certain internal inadequacies of philosophical naturalism that are commonly overlooked by both its friends and its foes. The criticisms of philosophical naturalism focus on certain questions concerning the ontological status of the objects of human reason and probe into the nature of human rationality and the conditions of its possibility. There is an implicit challenge to mainstream philosophical (...) opinion concerning the relationship between human thought and reasoning and the sorts of facts about human brains that can be revealed by empirical neuroscience. (shrink)

Rhetorica approaches armed, sword drawn, announcing the persuasive allure of violence. Whether with real or metaphorical weapons people can be "terrifying and eloquent," to borrow a phrase from Philippe-Joseph Salazar's Words Are Weapons: Inside ISIS's Rhetoric of Terror. The iconic image of Rhetorica's sword emerged from the early modern era of European rhetorical thinking, but the image is one with the violent symbolism that has been attached to rhetoric throughout its history and across cultures. The Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition abounds with (...) examples, deriving in part from the Aristotelian observation that fear can be manipulated for persuasive purposes... (shrink)

We argue that on logical grounds the constructivist algorithms mentioned by Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) do not resolve the learning paradox. In contrast, a neural network might acquire a more powerful structure by means of phase transitions. The latter kind of developmental mechanism can be in agreement with the constructivist manifesto.

It is claimed that gewirth does not address himself to the main lines of criticism put forward in "gewirth on reason and morality," but instead berates the author for insufficient attention to, Failure to acknowledge, And misinterpretation of, Aspects of what he (gewirth) has said. These charges are denied, With the suggestion that the shoe is on the other foot, And some of the main lines of criticism are re-Affirmed.

Essays on various aspects of contemporary American philosophy by nine contemporary American philosophers. The essays vary in type, ranging from quick surveys of current positions through surveys used as foils for personal opinions and defenses of particular meta-philosophical positions to contributions to particular fields which say nothing about current trends. Presumably aimed at a continental audience, the book should prove helpful to anyone who knows nothing about contemporary American philosophy.—A. E. J.

A study of four contemporary philosophers Naess believes "will take their place side by side in future histories of philosophy": Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre. Although Naess's own philosophy is more in the tradition of Carnap than of the others, this does not affect the quality of his exposition. He attempts to understand each philosopher in his own terms, and his treatment of them is notable for its insight and accuracy. There is no attempt at a systematic comparison of the (...) four, but similarities and differences are noted in the appropriate places. A good example of tolerance in philosophy.—A. E. J. (shrink)

A group of thirteen essays, most of them being either meta-philosophical or metaphysical. The latter group can be seen as applying the theme Wisdom plays so often in the former group and in his previous works: the comparison of one type of statement with another, leading to discoveries which resolve philosophical paradoxes but which can, if misused, engender new ones. Of special interest: "Religious Belief" and "The Metamorphosis of Metaphysics." The price of this volume is unfortunate, as is the printing (...) job.—A. E. J. (shrink)

The primary problems of philosophy are those "whose answers directly bear on our lives." Scriven believes definitive answers to primary questions can be given and justified, and he gives his answers in a straightforward, vigorous, no-holds-barred manner: judgments of greatness in art are usually best construed as expressions of personal preference; there is no God; "man is not just an animal or a machine, but yet he is an animal and a machine"; brain determinism is in no way incompatible with (...) free choice; it is rational to be moral. The work is intended as an introductory text, and could be good as such, despite the tendency for arguments to give way to sermons. The student would be forced to come to grips with philosophical questions by coming to grips with Scriven. Since alternative positions are not always indicated or presented in the strongest light, there is something left for the teacher to do.—A. E. J. (shrink)

With the appearance of this book, Kierkegaard's dissertation for the master's degree, all major works of Kierkegaard are available in English. Capel's translation is felicitous, and his "historical introduction" and notes are genuinely helpful. The Concept of Irony is itself an exercise in irony, and most problems of interpretation relate to that point. Although the book is of considerable independent interest, sprinkled with wit and insight, it is likely that it will be used mainly by scholars tracing the origins of (...) Kierkegaard's thought. It should be good for a handful of dissertations, and several hands full of articles.—A. E. J. (shrink)

Those who believe that linguistic philosophy has no principles are not likely to have their opinion dispelled by Waismann's book. The book, written prior to World War II, withdrawn from the publisher and constantly modified thereafter, does not attempt to present a set of philosophical or metaphilosophical principles. What it does present is a method, applied both to traditional philosophical problems and to the central themes of linguistic philosophy. If the method has a principle, it is to be found in (...) the concept of a grammatical rule. Philosophical questions are clarified by appeal to rules of grammar, beyond which there can be no appeal. Principles was written as a textbook, and could be quite useful as such since all the important issues of analytic philosophy are raised. Despite the obvious influence of Wittgenstein, the treatment of the issues, the linguistic philosophy presented, is Waismann's own unique blend. The blend is interesting and often fruitful.—A. E. J. (shrink)

The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true (...) or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic. (shrink)

In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...) to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 1979, Pages 139–141, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/39.3.139.

Conceptualism is the view that at least some perceptual representation is conceptual. This paper considers a prominent recent argument against Conceptualism due to Ned Block. Block’s argument appeals to patterns of color representation in infants, alleging that infants exhibit categorical perception of color while failing to deploy concepts of color categories. Accordingly, the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy must be non-conceptual. This argument is distinctive insofar as it threatens not only the view that all perception is conceptual, but (...) also views that restrict the Conceptualist thesis to perceptual categorization. However, I contend that it fails at two stages. Block’s arguments for the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy, and against color concept deployment in infancy, are unpersuasive. Thus, Block has not vanquished Conceptualism. I draw out implications for debates about the perception-cognition border and for the question of whether explicit categorization occurs in perception. (shrink)

This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will--a "two-way" power which ...

s div class="title" a terTwo Notions of Being: Entity and Essence s /div a ter - Volume 62 - E. J. Lowe.

A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference, there are strict constraints on information flow in the opposite direction. Despite its plausibility, this approach to the perception-cognition border has faced criticism in recent years. This article develops an updated version of the architectural approach, which (...) I call the dimension restriction hypothesis (DRH). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys both theoretical and empirical support, and also defends the view against several objections. (shrink)

The ability to perceive the shapes of things as enduring through changes in how they stimulate our sense organs is vital to our sense of stability in the world. But what sort of capacity is shape constancy, and how is it reflected in perceptual experience? This paper defends a pluralist account of shape constancy: There are multiple kinds of shape constancy centered on geometrical properties at various levels of abstraction, and properties at these various levels feature in the content of (...) perceptual experience, governing patterns of apparent shape similarity. I propose that the varieties of shape constancy are subserved by the syntactic complexity of perceptual shape representations. By assigning discrete constituents to various abstract shape parameters, these representations attune us to the preservation of certain abstract shape properties through changes in more determinate shape properties. Finally, I draw broader lessons concerning the nature and function of perceptual constancy. (shrink)